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CLEAN AIR ACT PROCEEDINGS
AFFECTING NATIONAL COAL MARKETS:
AN EXAMINATION OF THE AUTHORITY
OF THE PRESIDENT TO ALLOCATE
MARKETS
JAMS M. FRIEDMAN*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Section 1251 of the Clean Air Act, added by the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1 9 7 7 ,2 represents a classic case of legislation
enacted in response to the emerging interplay of the national energy policy with the national environmental policy. Prior to the
addition of section 125 to the 1977 amendment, serious concerns
were voiced by some coal interests about the impact of federal air
pollution regulations upon coal usage. To accommodate these
concerns, Congress hurriedly enacted section 125 as a stopgap
measure. Unfortunately, section 125 was formulated without a
careful inquiry into the underlying problems which its sponsors
intended it to resolve. As a result, it is impossible to predict
whether the cure it proposes will not actually cause greater harm
than the problem it sought to alleviate.
Briefly, section 125 is a complex statutory mechanism which
empowers the federal government to dictate where the operators
of major fuel burning facilities may purchase coal to fuel their
plants. The responsibility for implementing and administering
this scheme has been delegated to the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). This has resulted in an expansion of the EPA's
familiar role of overseeing and implementing national environmental policies into a new and unfamiliar role of market allo-

* A.B., Dartmouth College, 1963; J.D., Harvard University, 1966; Partner,
Guren, Merritt, Sogg & Cohen, Cleveland, Ohio.
1 42 U.S.C. § 7425 (Supp. I 1977).
2 Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (amending the Clean Air Act, now codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 1 1977)). For the legislative history of the 1977
amendments, see H.R. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in
[1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1077.
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cator, economic regulator and energy overseer.
11.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Section 125 was added to the Clean Air Act as part of the
1977 amendments.' Although this particular provision potentially
could have as important an effect on the coal industry as any
other legislation affecting the industry in recent years, no committee hearings were ever held on the proposal. Instead, it was
proposed as a floor amendment during the debate on the amendments. The entire legislative history of the section consists of
fourteen pages in the Congressional Record
which contains the
4
floor debate in the House and Senate.
The Senate adopted section 125 by a narrow forty-three to
forty-two margin.5 A summary of the floor debate indicates that
the section was opposed by the father of the Clean Air Act and
floor manager of the 1977 Amendments, Senator Edmund S.
Muskie of Maine. Senator Muskie's opposition to the section was
based on the belief that such legislation had no place in the Clean
Air Act and represented an unsound policy of encouraging a balkanization of national coal markets.6 However, the supporters of
the section prevailed, arguing the need to encourage the utilization of nearby Eastern coal resources for generating electricity
rather than transporting coal from the Far West. 7 Nevertheless,
as discussed below, to date the section has only been invoked to
prevent the utilization of Eastern low-sulfur fuel in nearby generating plants as a means of meeting new emission standards.
Subsequent to its adoption, the provisions of section 125
were again amended and modified by section 661 of the National
3 The section's prime sponsor was Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio.
Senator Metzenbaun was joined in his efforts by Senators Jennings Randolph of
West Virginia, Birch Bayh of Indiana and Richard Schweicker of Pennsylvania.
4 See 123 CONG. REc. H5026-27 (daily ed. May 28, 1977); 123 CONG. REc.
S9449-62 (daily ed. June 10, 1977).
5 123 CONG. Rc. S9459 (daily ed. June 10, 1977).
6 Id. at S9450-52 (daily ed. June 10, 1977).
1 Id. at S9453 (daily ed. June 10, 1977). Recently, a number of Senators and
Representatives who supported § 125 have indicated to the author that their intention was to encourage the use of Eastern coal rather than allow the importation
of Western coal.
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Energy Conservation
Hansen amendment,
of state governors to
ther modifies section

Policy Act.8 This amendment, known as the
modifies section 125 by removing the power
issue rules or orders.' The amendment fur125 by requiring the President to make cer-

8

42 U.S.C. § 6215 (Supp. II 1978). This amendment provides in part:
(a) Restrictions on issuance of orders or rules by Governor pursuant to
section 7425 of this title.
No Governor of a State may issue any order or rule pursuant to
section 7425 of this title to any major fuel burning stationary source (or
class or category thereof)(1) prohibiting such source from using fuels other than locally or regionally available coal or coal derivatives, or
(2) requiring such source to enter into a contract (or contracts) for supplies of locally or regionally available coal or coal
derivatives.
()
Petition to President
(1) The Governor of any State may petition the President
to exercise the President's authorities pursuant to section 7425 of
this title with respect to any major fuel burning stationary source
located in such State.
(2) Any petition under paragraph (1) shall include documentation which could support a finding that significant local or
regional economic disruption or unemployment would result from
use by such source of(A) coal or coal derivatives other than locally or regionally available coal,
(B) petroleum products,
(C) natural gas, or
(D) any combination of fuels referred to in subparagraphs (A) through (C), to comply with the requirements
of a State implementation plan pursuant to section 7410 of
this title.
(c) Action to be taken by President
Within 90 days after the submission of a Governor's petition under
subsection (b) of this section, the President shall either issue an order or
rule pursuant to section 7425 of this title or deny such petition, stating
in writing his reasons for such denial. In making his determination to
issue such an order or rule pursuant to this subsection, the President
must find that such order or rule would(1) be consistent with section 7425 of this title;
(2) result in no significant increase in the consumption of
energy;
(3) not subject the ultimate consumer to significantly higher
energy costs; and
(4) not violate any contractual relationship between such
source and any supplier or transporter of fuel to such source.
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tain specific factual findings before issuing any rules or orders
under section 125.10
I.

CURRENT PROCEEDINGS UNDER SECTION 125

The first proceedings undertaken pursuant to section 125
were initiated by Governor James Thompson of Illinois in conformance to the authority granted to state governors under section 125(a).11 The hearings were convened before a special hearing officer appointed by the Governor to determine whether or
not significant economic disruption or unemployment would result from the utilization of Western low-sulfur coal at the
Powerton Station operated by Commonwealth Edison.1 2 After extensive hearings, the special hearing examiner found that no economic disruption or unemployment would occur as a direct result
of the use of such low sulfur coal at Powerton. However, he did
find that such a fuel shift could have a "ripple effect" on other
Illinois coal producers.13 Following this decision, Governor
Thompson petitioned President Carter to act under the authority
granted to him by section 125(a) 14 and issue an order under section 125(b)1 5 prohibiting the use of the Western coal. On August
10Id. See also notes 79-82 infra and accompanying text.
1 42 U.S.C. § 7425(a) (Supp. I 1977). It should be noted that the Hansen
amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 6215 (Supp. II 1978), did not remove the state governors
authority to make such determinations.
12 Commonwealth Edison had announced its plan to comply with the Illinois
sulfur dioxide emission limitations by using Western low-sulfur coal rather than
by installing flue gas desulfurization equipment that may have allowed it to continue to use Illinois high-sulfur coal.
13

HEARING OFFICER'S FINAL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR-OPINION, FINDINGS OF

FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND RECOMMENDATIONS, In the

matter of hearings held

pursuant to Section 125 of the Federal Clean Air Act concerning Commonwealth
Edison's Powerton Station.
" 42 U.S.C. § 7425(a) (Supp. 1 1977). This section also grants the President
or his designee the power to determine, after notice and opportunity for a public
hearing, whether action under § 125(b) is necessary to prevent or minimize significant local or regional economic disruption or unemployment from the use of Western coal.
15 Id. § 7425(b). This subsection provides:
(b) Use of locally or regionally available coal or coal derivatives to
comply with implementation plan requirements
Upon a determination under subsection (a) of this section(1) such Governor, with the written consent of the President or his designee,
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21, 1979 this petition was rejected, primarily for failure to state a
prima facie case for action under the statute and the Hansen
amendment.1 6
The only other section 125 proceeding to date occurred in
Ohio. These proceedings have been far more extensive than those
in Illinois and after more than twelve months of hearings and reports are still under way. The proceedings began when Senator
Howard Metzenbaum, Governor James Rhodes, the Ohio Mining
and Reclamation Association, and District Six of the United Mine
Workers of America each, within a three month span of time, requested the EPA to determine whether to invoke section 125 to
prevent some Ohio generating stations from switching from Ohio
high-sulfur coal to Eastern low-sulfur coal as a means of compliance with the EPA's October 1979 deadline concerning air pollution emission requirements. Pursuant to these requests a special
EPA hearing panel was established. This panel held public hearings of a "town meeting" type on the subject in Cleveland and St.
Clairsville, Ohio in August 1978. Simultaneously with these hearings, the EPA commissioned a number of special consultants to
study economic and engineering issues involved in the hearings.
In addition, the hearing record was kept open for the submission
of written comments by interested parties until October 16,
1978.17

On December 20, 1978 the EPA simultaneously released two
of the consultants' studies and issued a "Proposed Determination" of economic disruption and unemployment in certain coun-

(2) the President's designee with the written consent of
such Governor, or
(3) the President
may by rule or order prohibit any such major fuel burning stationary
source (or class or category thereof) from using fuels other than locally
or regionally available coal or coal derivatives to comply with implementation plan requirements. In taking any action under this subsection, the
Governor, the President, or the President's designee as the case may be,
shall take into account, the final cost to the consumer of such an action.
,0 Letter from Jack H. Watson, Jr., White House aide, to James Thompson,
Governor of illinois (Aug. 21, 1979).
17 Despite the EPA's original Federal Register notice to the contrary, some of
the consultants' studies were not made available for public analysis or comment
prior to the closing of the record. See 43 Fed. Reg. 30,113 (1978).
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ties in southeastern Ohio.18 Further public hearings of the same
type were held in Columbus, Ohio on January 30, 1979 and additional written public comments were accepted by the EPA until
March 28, 1979. Despite the fact that no "Final Determination"
had been issued, and that several of the critical consultants' studies had yet to be completed or made available for public comment, the EPA announced the formation of a team of negotiators
to meet with the Ohio electric utility companies to force "voluntary" utilization of Ohio high-sulfur coal, rather than implementing the previously announced plans to switch to Eastern low-sulfur coal. The negotiating team met with several, but not all, Ohio
utilities, and then ceased contact in April 1979.
As a result of the EPA's failure to complete and publish several of the most important consultants' studies pertaining to the
elements of a "Final Determination" and as a result of the extensive litigation surrounding the statute and the proceedings commenced thereunder, the current status of the Ohio section 125
proceedings is unsettled. On September 6, 1979 the EPA published a "Reproposed Determination" relating to the Ohio section
125 proceedings which would have terminated them because of a
proposed finding that the alleged economic and unemployment
effects were "not sufficiently significant to necessitate action
under subsections 125(b) and (c)."' 19 However, this proposal was
met with opposition from Ohio coal miners and operators and is
itself now in limbo following even more public hearings and extended comment periods on the subject.
IV.

LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE STATUTORY SCHEME

A. Substantive Issues
A variety of important substantive and procedural questions
concerning the operation of section 125 will have to be addressed
and answered in the subsequent Ohio proceedings and other such
proceedings initiated elsewhere. One of the most interesting questions which has yet to be thoroughly analyzed is the determination of who may initiate or request proceedings leading to the issuance of a section 125 rule or order. Under the existing statutory

43 Fed. Reg. 60,652 (1978).
1944 Fed. Reg. 52030, 52032 (1979).
24
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provisions, the Governor of Illinois clearly was qualified to do
In the Ohio proceedings, however, private parties simply notified the EPA of their desire that investigations and hearings
leading to possible section 125 action be initiated. In that instance, the EPA actively cooperated with this request and may
actually have encouraged it. In addition, the EPA took it upon
itself to perform the investigations, rather than requiring the proponents of agency action to present proof to justify that action.
The question remains, however, as to what discretion the EPA
would have to refuse to act on a request for such hearings and
investigations and whether such a refusal could be tested by court
action or appealed.
SO.20

A second area of uncertainty in a section 125(a) determination is the requirement of identification of the specific "major fuel
burning stationary sources" which are alleged to be the cause of
the economic disruption or unemployment and which would then
be the subject of orders or rules issued pursuant to subsections
(b) and (c) of section 125. Subsection (d) of that section identifies
these sources as those having a design capacity of 250 million
b.t.u.'s per hour and which are not in compliance with the requirements of an applicable implementation plan. 21
Although it has been assumed that the major targets of section 125 orders would be electric utility boilers, it is important to

note that many nonutility industrial boilers are covered by this
size classification. In the context of alleged market disruption, it
will be important to determine whether or not section 125 orders
or rules can be applied to some stationary sources within this category without applying to all of them equally. Since the prosperity of a particular local or regional coal market can rarely be
20

42 U.S.C. § 7425(a) (Supp. I 1977).

11 Id. § 7425(d). Subsection (d) provides:

(d) Existing or new major fuel burning stationary sources
This section applies only to existing or new major fuel burning stationary sources(1) which have the design capacity to produce 250,000,000
Btu's per hour (or its equivalent), as determined by the Administrator, and
(2) which are not in compliance with the requirements of an
applicable implementation plan or which are prohibited from
burning oil or natural gas, or both, under any other authority of
law.
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traced solely to any one source within the classification, the limits
of any permissible discrimination among such sources will have to
be carefully determined.
An additional difficulty in the identification of stationary
sources subject to such orders or rules is the limitation to those
not in compliance with an applicable implementation plan. Section 125(d) does not specify when such noncompliance is to be
determined.32 It could be argued with equal merit that section
i25(d) refers to noncompliance in 1977 (as of the date of the
adoption of the legislation), or the date of petitions filed with the
EPA, or the date of any hearings, or the date of any final order.
Possibly the single most important threshold question which
must be addressed in the statutory scheme established in section
125 is the definition of "locally or regionally available coal." 23
Even at this early stage in the history of section 125, this phrase
has given rise to a bewildering variety of definitions and interpretations which vary substantially according to the perspective of
the particular analyst. Subsection (h) of section 12524 offers no
real help in this respect even though it purports to define the
phrase. It simply provides that the Administrator may define the
phrase with respect to coal which in his judgment can "feasibly
be mined or produced in the local or regional area (as determined
by the Administrator) in which the major fuel burning stationary
source is located." 2 This circular definition is plainly of little
value. The only assistance it offers is the indication that the site
of the fuel burning source is the key to the definition of the locale
or region from which the coal must be available.
A careful analysis of the Senate debate on section 125 might
easily lead to the conclusion that the legislative intention as to
the meaning of "regionally available coal" is related to the dichot22Id.

Id. § 7425(b).
, Id. § 7425(h). This subsection provides:
(h) Locally or regionally available coal or coal derivatives
For the purpose of this section the term "locally or regionally available coal or coal derivatives" means coal or coal derivatives which is, or
can in the judgment of the State or the Administrator feasibly be, mined
or produced in the local or regional area (as determined by the Administrator) in which the major fuel burning stationary source is located.
"2 Id.
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omy between broad regional definitions of "Eastern" and "Western" coal alluded to earlier.26 The Senate debate is replete with
references to coal from the far West as a threat to Eastern coal
markets.27 A wide cross section of sponsors and supporters of section 125 in both the House of Representatives and the Senate,
including the section's prime sponsor, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, have indicated that it was their intention to give this type
of definition to "regionally available coal" and that the purpose of
section 125 was not to subdivide the broad regional coal markets
of the nation into balkanized subareas. In particular, these individuals have specifically advised the EPA in written comments
that it was not their intention to limit the definition of "region"
to a single state.
Standard linguistic analysis and common sense dictate that
the term "regional" should be interpreted to apply to a large area,
not a single state or part of a state. Furthermore, authoritative
studies of coal markets by independent agencies of the federal
government and other organizations have unanimously applied
this term to a broad geographical area such as the "Appalachian
Region." These studies, conducted by the Government Accounting Office,28 the Federal Trade Commission,29 the Justice Department,3 0 the Ford Foundation s and similar organizations,3 2 all reject the notion of a region as proposed by the EPA and the Ohio
mining industry. Furthermore, an economic analysis of actual
sources of coal used by the Ohio utilities over the past few years
negates a definition of region limited
to anything less than the
33
Appalachian region in its entirety.
2 See note 7 supra.
27 See 123 CONG. REc. S9449-60 (daily ed. June 10, 1977).
28 THE STATE OF COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY, REPORT

TO THE CON-

GRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 1977).
19 THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,
ECONOMIC REPORT: CONCENTRATION
LEVELS AND TRENDS IN THE ENERGY SECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES ECONOMY.
30 COMPETITION IN THE COAL INDUSTRY:

REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES DE-

PARTMENT OF JUSTICE PURSUANT TO SECTION 8 OF THE FEDERAL COAL LEASING

AMENDMENTS ACT OF 1975 (May 1978).
31 COMPETITION IN THE UNIrED STATES ENERGY INDUSTRY, Study

by the Ford
Foundation.
1 Elizinga & Hogarty, The Problem of Geographic Market Delineation Revisited. "The Case of Coal," 23 Antitrust Bull. 1 (1978).
" Additional factual submissions and brief for the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., In the Matter of Proceedings under Section 125(a) instituted with re-
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In the face of such overwhelming data and opinion, proponents of the section 125 proceedings retreated to a theory that the
definition of region is intended to preserve so-called "historic
sources of supply" for generating stations. The gist of this argument seems to be that, despite the specific use of geographical
terms such as "local" or "regional," section 125(b) provides legal
basis for requiring specific stationary sources to continue indefinitely their use of specific types of coal from specific areas based
on past patterns of consumption. However, there is little or no
support for this contention in the words of subsection (b) or the
legislative history. Furthermore, this theory completely ignores
the use of the word "available" in conjunction with the regional
or local identification of the coal sources in the subsection. The
concept of availability is important since it conveys the intention
that coal which was available to a source, but not necessarily previously used for other reasons, would still satisfy the subsection
(b) requirement of regional availability. Thus, the definition of
regional availability must be based on geography and economics
and not a spurious historical criterion.34
In addition, the consulting study prepared by I.C.F., Inc. for
the EPA as part of the Ohio section 125 hearings is virtually useless with respect to any observations on the appropriate definition
of "regionally available coal."3 5 This is because the consultant was
given instructions to limit its inquiry solely to the market for coal
mined within the state of Ohio only and does not even consider
high-sulfur producers in West Virginia or Kentucky, even though
the EPA later indicated that it may include such production in a
proposed definition of regionally available coal.3 6 In fact, the
I.C.F. study is seriously deficient in attributing coal consumed by
utilities located in the state of Michigan to the Ohio utility companies which are the parties to the proceeding.
spect to the State of Ohio, at 44-47 (filed Oct. 16, 1978).
It is interesting to note that if the historic criterion argument is accepted
by the courts and high-sulfur coal producers in Ohio do receive a guaranteed market equal to so-called current levels of consumption, they will receive a windfall as
additional new plants begin their consumption of high-sulfur coal in addition to
the guaranteed base consumption.
31 I.C.F., INC., DRAFT REPORT, POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON THE OHIO COAL MARKET:
OHIO UTILITY COMPLIANCE wITH APPLICABLE AIR EMISSIONS LIMITATIONS, SECTION

125

STUDY,

[hereinafter cited as DRAFT REPORT].

36Id.
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Finally, in the face of the very restrictive definition of "regional" being considered by the EPA, Congress is considering legislation that would amend section 125(h) to prevent the Administrator from defining a region for the purposes of section 125 in
such a way as to exclude coal from any state contiguous to the
state in which the major coal burning stationary source is located.37 Congressman Carl Perkins and other members of the
House have clearly indicated in a brief amicus curiae, which they
submitted in McCoy-Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,3 that the legislative history and
their own specific intention negated any definition of the word
"region" which would prevent the free flow of coal across state
borders within the eastern portion of the country or the Appalachian region as a whole.
The second major threshold determination which must be
made in order to substantiate the need for an order pursuant to
section 125 is the existence or expectation of "significant local or
regional economic disruption or unemployment." 9 Nothing in
section 125(a) or the limited legislative history indicates what the
precise difference, if any, between economic disruption and unemployment is, nor has that issue been explored in either the Ohio
or Illinois proceedings. However, for the purposes of most discussions, it has been assumed that these terms are nearly
synonymous.
An important issue arising from this required finding in the
limited investigations in the Ohio hearings is the definition of the
area, locality or region within which such economic disruption or
unemployment must be measured. Since the terminology used is
identical to that in section 125(b) and discussed above with respect to the origin of the coal which may be used permissibly, it
seems likely that any economic disruption or unemployment must
be measured within the same locality or region used to determine
"regionally available coal" under subsection (b). Nevertheless, in
its Ohio economic consultants' studies, the EPA appears to have
adopted a much more limited view of the area within which eco'7 This legislation is being sponsored by Congressman Carl Perkins of Kentucky and members of the House of Representatives representing at least five
other states.
" 13 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1025 (E.D. Ky. 1979).

39 42 U.S.C. § 7425(a) (Supp. I 1977).
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nomic disruption and unemployment may be found. 40 Thus, even
though the EPA and its consultants appear to have defined the
coal availability region under subsection (b) as the entire state of
Ohio (plus, perhaps, adjoining high-sulfur coal producing regions
in West Virginia and Kentucky), their definition of the region of
economic impact under subsection (a) appears to be limited to a
few sparsely populated counties in the coal fields of southeastern
Ohio. No justification for the adoption of these varying definitions of "region" has ever been offered by the EPA.
In addition to the geographical dimension of the definition of
economic disruption or unemployment under subsection (a), serious questions must be raised with respect to the requirement of
"significant economic disruption or unemployment.' 4 1 First, the
issue of what level or relative amount of disruption or unemployment is to be deemed "significant" must be resolved. This issue
can only be answered by reference to the overall size of the region. That is, unemployment which might be deemed significant
in the context of one small county would clearly not be significant
in the context of a large state or multi-state region containing
millions of people. In fact, the most recent "Reproposed Determination" by the EPA acknowledges that only 0.05% of the total
2
Ohio labor force might be affected.4
Further, the temporal dimension must be considered. That
is, disruption or unemployment which lasts for a short or transient period may very well be considered much less significant
than that which would last for a longer period of time. Thus, a
determination of the length of time which any purported unemployment might last is crucial to an overall conclusion about
whether significant disruption or unemployment is imminent as a
result of a switch to low-sulfur fuel. This is particularly true in
view of the coal industry's history of cyclical and often intermittent employment.
Another important issue in the determination of economic
disruption or unemployment under subsection (a) is the question
of whether such economic effect is to be measured on a net or
40 See DAFTr REPORT, supra note 35; TEMPLE, BARKER & SLOANE, INC., Ohio
Section 125 Study- Regional Economic Impact Analysis (Dec. 14, 1978).
41 42 U.S.C. § 7425(a) (Supp. I 1977) (emphasis added).
41 44 Fed. Reg. 52,031 (1979).
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gross basis; that is, whether only effects in the coal mining and
related areas are to be considered or whether the possible negative effects on employment elsewhere should be offsetting considerations. In the Ohio proceedings, much evidence has been produced to show that any order requiring the use of high-sulfur coal
and the installation of scrubber equipment would have a more
negative effect on prosperity and employment in the non-coal
mining portion of the state of Ohio than a beneficial effect within
the coal mining region. The EPA has not directly addressed this
issue, but rather has contended that these negative employment
effects in industries such as the steel, automotive or chemical industries simply will not occur. If the evidence to the contrary is
given weight at all, a hard decision will have to be made by Congress or the courts as to whether the EPA is empowered simply to
trade non-coal mining jobs (which would be lost through an increase in energy rates attributable to a section 125 order) for coal
mining jobs which allegedly would be saved. This issue is particularly difficult in view of the fact that the non-mining jobs would
probably be lost permanently, while the effects in the coal mining
industry will probably be temporary. The economic effect on consumers, in the form of increased residential electric rates and increased cost of goods and services, will be considered later in this
article under a discussion of the Hansen amendment.
An interesting technical issue which has arisen with respect
to a few particular plants in the Ohio proceedings relates to the
question of whether or not section 125 may be applied in the instance where a switch to low-sulfur fuel (even if such fuel is
deemed nonregional) is undertaken for reasons other than compliance with an applicable state implementation plan. For example, at least one plant in Ohio has switched to low-sulfur fuel in
order to prevent operating problems, such as slagging in its boilers, rather than to control sulfur dioxide emissions.43 Because section 125 specifies that economic disruption or unemployment
must be caused by the use of nonregional coal for the purpose of
meeting the requirements of an implementation plan, it is not
clear whether the use of such coal for some other purpose could
trigger the application of the sanctions of section 125. Problems
related to other chemical and physical characteristics, such as fly

"This

has occurred at the Dayton Power and Light Company's Stuart Plant.
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ash problems, might fall in this category as well.

B. ProceduralIssues
Aside from the complex substantive problems discussed
above, section 125(a) presents a number of procedural questions
which can have a serious impact on the rights of those subjected
to such hearings. Because of the vague and subjective nature of
many of the facets of the statutory scheme, the procedural framework of the section is critical.
Perhaps the single most important procedural issue is
whether or not full adjudicatory hearings are required in the public hearing phase of section 125(a). 4 4 The EPA has taken the posi-

tion that full adjudicatory hearings are not required and has held
what it has termed "town meeting" hearings governed by rulemaking procedures of section 553 of the Federal Administrative
Procedure Act.45 Specifically, this has meant that statements of

witnesses have not been made under oath, no cross-examination
has been allowed, nor have the credentials or expertise of any of
the witnesses been tested or even deemed relevant. Strong argu-

ments have been presented to the EPA that full adversary adjudicatory hearings are the only way in which the substantial rights of
the parties involved in the proceedings may be properly
46
protected.

4,

The EPA is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C.

§§ 551-59 (1976). Section 553 of the APA sets forth the procedure to be followed
by an agency when its actions are characterized as rulemaking. However, when the
agency action is characterized as adjudicatory in nature § 554 of the APA governs
the proceeding. Before an action is taken under the provisions of § 125(a) of the
Clean Air Act, there must be "notice and an opportunity for a public hearing."
This requirement is ambiguous as to whether the EPA is to proceed by rulemaking or adjudication. However, the United States Supreme Court in United States
v. Florida East Coast Ry., 410 U.S. 224 (1973) found that while the precise words
of § 554 are not an absolute prerequisite to its application, its provisions do not
apply unless Congress has clearly indicated that the "hearing" required by the
statute must be a trial-type hearing on the record. See also United States Lines,
Inc. v. Federal Maritime Comm'n, 584 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
Apart from the APA, adjudicatory hearings may be constitutionally mandated
where a single person or a group of individuals are exceptionally affected by an
agency action and such action is based upon individual factual situations.
Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
45 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (1976).
4' As noted in note 44 supra, § 125(a) is ambiguous as to what type of hearing
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The thrust of these arguments is that: (1) because section
125(c) provides for relief which has a substantial retrospective impact on existing contracts between utilities and their suppliers,
and (2) because action taken under section 125(b) or (c) must be
specific as to each generating facility, any action taken under section 125(b) or (c) is "adjudicatory" rather than "rulemaking" in
nature. 47 In short, the argument is that proceedings under section
125 are "couched as rulemaking, general in scope and prospective
in operation, but are in reality designed to have an individualized
impact.' 48 Alternatively, it has been argued that even if the proceedings do constitute rulemaking rather than adjudication, the
proceedings fall within the language of Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,49 which
states that under "extremely compelling circumstances" procedu-

ral safeguards beyond those required by the Administrative
Pro50
cedure Act may be required as a matter of due process.
Not only has the EPA declined to provide the procedural due
process safeguards of an adjudicatory hearing in a section 125(a)
proceeding, but it has consistently carried out the hearings and
accompanying studies in such a manner as to prevent timely and
effective critique and rebuttal of some of the most significant
findings. Furthermore, questions with respect to the chronological
order in which the EPA has studied some of the critical issues
have also been raised. As an example, EPA has made determina-

is required. Arguably, the EPA has the discretion under subsection (a) to proceed
either by rulemaking or adjudication. If this is true, then the choice of mode
under which to proceed lies in the informed discretion of the EPA. See Securities
& Exchange Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
47Rulemaking has often been referred to as a quasi-legislative action. That is,
the agency is making policy-type decisions based upon legislative facts such as
reports and studies. On the other hand, adjudication has been referred to as a
quasi-judicial action because it is directed toward individual decisions based upon
individual facts. A strong argument can be made that since most § 125 proceedings will be site-specific and dependent upon individualized facts, the EPA is operating as a quasi-judicial body and therefore should conduct its hearings to conform to this role. Buttressing this argument is the fact that most of the studies
conducted by the EPA's consultants under § 125 have been highly site-specific
with respect to alternative arrangements at the sources in question.
48American Airlines, Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 359 F.2d 624, 631 (D.C.

Cir. 1966).
4 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
11 Id. at 543.
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tions of economic disruption and unemployment as well as studies of coal sales without any initial determination of the definition
or boundaries of the crucial "region" within which all of these
effects are to be studied.
Assuming that the EPA reaches a final determination under
section 125(a), the question of whether such a determination constitutes a final appealable order under section 307(b) of the 1977
Amendments"' will have to be answered. In the case of Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency,52 which was filed in the United States District

Court for the Northern District of Ohio, the defendant EPA argued that by reason of section 307(b) only the court of appeals
has jurisdiction over any issues raised in connection with section
125 proceedings, and that judicial challenges in the court of appeals cannot be brought until all actions, including a presidential
order under section 125(b)53 and the promulgation of new compliance schedules under section 125(c)," have been taken.5 5 The
EPA further argued that the section 125(b) and (c) orders are jurisdictional prerequisites for judicial review under section 307(b),
and by operation of section 125(f)56 constitute revisions to the ap81

42 U.S.C. § 7607(b) (Supp. I 1977). This subsection provides in part: "A

petition for review of.

.

.any

. . .

final action of the Administrator under this

chapter ...which is locally or regionally applicable may be filed only in the
United States Court of Appeals for the appropriate circuit."
82 No.-C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 28, 1979).
- 42 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (Supp. I 1977).
Id. § 7425(c).
No. C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 28, 1979).
- 42 U.S.C. § 7425(f). Subsection (f)provides:
(M Treatment of prohibitions, rules, or orders as requirements or parts
of plans under other provisions
For purposes of sections 7413 and 7420 of this title a prohibition
under subsection (b) of this section, and a corresponding rule or order
under subsection (c) of this section, shall be treated as a requirement of
section 7413 of this title. For purposes of any plan (or portion thereof)
promulgated under section 7410(c) of this title, any rule or order under
subsection (c) of this section, corresponding to a prohibition under subsection (b) of this section, shall be treated as a part of such plan. For
purposes of section 7413 of this title, a prohibition under subsection (b)
of this section, applicable to any source, and a corresponding rule or
order under subsection (c) of this section, shall be treated as part of the
applicable implementation plan for the State in which subject source is
located.
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plicable implementation plan, which can be considered only by
the court of appeals pursuant to section 307(b)(1). 51
Another procedural issue arises from section 125 under subsection (a). Once a determination of significant economic disruption or unemployment resulting from the use of other than locally
or regionally available coal is made pursuant to section 125(a),
the President may take action to prohibit using such fuel for the
purpose of complying with implementation plan requirements."
The procedures which would apply to the issuance of such rule or
order are not clear, since this portion of section 125 has yet to be
effectuated. Should the President choose to proceed by order, the
question is raised again of what type proceeding-adjudicatory or
rulemaking-would be necessary. Since most such applications of
section 125 will be site-specific, a strong argument has been proposed that full adjudicatory proceedings are a procedural requirement before imposing an order on a specific fuel-burning stationary source."
Section 125(b) also includes a requirement that the President
take into account the final cost to the consumer of any such action.6 0 This provision was obviously written into section 125
before the passage of the Hansen amendment,"' which requires a
specific finding by the President that his action "would not sub' '62
ject the ultimate consumer to significantly higher energy costs.

The relationship between these two provisions is not yet clear.
Theoretically, under the original terms of 125(b), the President
could still issue an order even if he had determined there would
be higher consumer costs, as long as he had "taken them into account. ' s3 However, the Hansen amendment provision appears to

be more absolute, indicating that the ultimate consumer must not
be subjected to significantly higher energy costs, regardless of
87 No.

C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 28, 1979).
5 42 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (Supp. I 1977).
89 See note 47 supra.
42 U.S.C. § 7425(b) (Supp. I 1977). Subsection (b) provides in pertinent

parts: "In taking any action under this subsection ....

the President ... shall

take into account, the final cost to the consumer of such an action." (emphasis

added).
61 Id. § 6215 (Supp. H 1978).
62 Id.
63 Id.

§ 7425(b) (Supp. I 1977).
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what other facts the President might believe to counterbalance
these higher costs.
Once a prohibition of the use of nonregional or nonlocal coal
has been made under section 125(b), the President must require
operators of stationary sources to enter into long-term contracts
for supplies of locally or regionally available coal 6' and to enter
into contracts to acquire additional means of emission limitation
necessary to meet emission standards of the Clean Air Act while
burning such coal. 5 These remedies appear to be mandatory, and
the question of what discretion the President has in fashioning an
appropriate order to minimize or prevent economic disruption or
unemployment is open at this time. For instance, since many operators of stationary sources do not utilize long-term contracts for
their total coal supply, what discretion would such an order leave
them as to the mix of long-term and spot purchase coal?
In addition, the question of what arrangements would satisfy
the requirement to acquire "additional means of emission limitation" 66 may become important. For example, it has been assumed
that the only possible solution would be the use of flue-gas desulfurization equipment (commonly termed "scrubbers"). However,
the possibility of the use of intermittent controls and other techniques might be possible, although a serious question would arise
as to whether these techniques constitute means of emission limitation under the statute.
These technical questions under section 125(c) take on great
urgency when it is considered that, at least in the Ohio situation,
it was physically impossible to install and operate scrubbers by
the compliance date set by the Clean Air Act for the limitation of
sulfur dioxide emissions. That deadline was October 1979, and all
parties conceded that a minimum of three additional years would
be necessary for the construction of scrubbers. In addition, the
EPA consultants have conceded that even given an unlimited
time period, such additional means of emission control for the use
of local or regional coal would be impossible to construct at all at
certain small, constricted stationary source sites owned by some

Id. § 7425(c)(1).
65 Id. § 7425(c)(2).
" Id.
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of the Ohio utilities.67 In these cases, the EPA consultants have
further conceded that the use of low-sulfur coal (whether deemed
to be regional or nonregional) is absolutely necessary in order to
meet the EPA emission limitations.6 8 Given the mandatory nature
of the directive of section 125(c), this physical impossibility could
cause additional complications in any attempt to implement such
an order.
Finally, the forum and procedure for appealing rules or orders issued pursuant to sections 125(b) and (c) are as unclear as
the procedures relating to section 125(a). These uncertainties
pose issues of constitutional magnitude, especially when a discretionary order of the President is involved. This is true since it has
long been established that the President of the United States
cannot be restrained from performing nonministerial duties, i.e.,
those duties which call for the exercise of discretion or judgment
by the President.6 It is clear that the presidential action called
for under section 125(b) is nonministerial since there is a good
deal of discretion involved. This means that the President probably cannot be enjoined from issuing a rule or order under section
125(b).
Section 125(e)70 raises another procedural issue. This subsection provides that any action required to be taken by a major fuel
burning source by reason of orders under sections 125(b) and (c)
will not be deemed to constitute a modification for purposes of
section 111(a)(2) and (4) of the Clean Air Act,7 1 unless otherwise
specifically provided by rule by the Administrator for good cause.
The effect of this provision is to prevent a major fuel burning
source from having to comply with the new source performance
standards in section 111 if it is ordered to use "locally or regionally available" coal and install scrubbers. This provision has not
received much scrutiny in the context of the Illinois and Ohio
proceedings.

67 ENGINEERING STUDY FOR OHIO COAL BURNING POWER PLANTS: FINAL REPORT

87-311 (March 1979).
e Id.
69 Mississippi v. Johnson, 7L U.S. (4 Wall) 475 (1866).
42 U.S.C. § 7425(e) (Supp. I 1977).
71 Id. § 7425(a)(2), (4).

70
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On the other hand, section 125(f)7 2 has received considerable

attention in the pending proceedings. This is because it relates to
the jurisdiction of any appeal from a prohibition order under subsection (b) and the promulgation of alternative compliance schedules under subsection (c). Section 125(f) provides that such prohibition orders and alternative compliance schedules shall be
treated as a part of any implementation plan promulgated by a
state, or by the Administrator of the EPA if he has promulgated
an implementation plan for a state.7 3 As a result, any such prohibition rule or order would be deemed a revision of the implementation plan, reviewable exclusively and originally in the court of
74
appeals pursuant to section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act. Illus-

trative of this fact, the EPA in Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency 76 moved
to dismiss Cleveland Electric's pending claims on the ground that
only the court of appeals would have jurisdiction of actions taken
under section 125, by reason of the operation of sections 125(f)
and 307(b).
As discussed above, the Hansen amendment modified the
original provisions of section 125 by rescinding the power of state
governors to issue any order or rule pursuant to section 125(b),
instead relegating them to petitioning the President to exercise
his authority under that subsection. After the anticlimatic result
in the Illinois state proceedings, this is what Governor James
Thompson of Illinois did-without success. 7 8 Further, under the
Hansen amendment the President must make four specific findings before he is empowered to issue rules or orders under subsec7
tion (b). 7

First, the President must find that such order or rule would
be consistent with section 125.78 This requirement might support
an argument that the Hansen amendment findings apply only to
Id. § 7425(f).
Id.
7.Id. § 7607(b).
72
73

71
76

7

No. C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 28, 1979).
See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
The wording of the amendment is ambiguous as to whether the President

must make such findings only as a part of a proceeding initiated by a state governor or whether it applies to all § 125 proceedings.
78 42 U.S.C. § 6215 (Supp. II 1978).
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orders or rules issued pursuant to a gubernatorial petition.
Second, the President must find that such order or rule
would result in no significant increase in the consumption of energy.79 This particular requirement will focus attention on the socalled "power penalty" imposed by the installation of scrubbers
on existing power plants. Scrubbers may utilize up to seven percent of the capacity of a generating station, and the question of
whether or not their installation amounts to a significant increase
in the consumption of energy has never been considered. There
may also be other energy consumption factors to be considered in
this regard.
Third, the President must find that a section 125 order or
rule would not subject the ultimate consumer to significantly
higher energy costs.80 This appears to be an absolute prohibition
as compared to the original provision in section 125(b) requiring
the President merely to take consumer costs into consideration
prior to his action. Findings under this subsection will focus attention on the high cost of scrubber installation and operation
and comparisons to the utilization of low-sulfur coal-and its ultimate availability. A further question might well be raised as to
the identity of the "ultimate consumer," since this may be interpreted to include a reference not only to the users of electricity
but to the consumers of those products which are produced
through the use of electricity. Particularly in inflationary times,
this could be a matter of major importance, and this issue has
been specifically identified by the Council on Wage and Price Stability in its negative report on the Ohio proceedings.8 1
Fourth, the President must find that such rule or order
would not violate any contractual relationship between such
source and any supplier or transporter of fuel to such source."
The interpretation of this requirement will have significant impact on existing, low-sulfur coal contracts. The time at which any
such contractual relationship must be in effect has not yet been
tested, although a reasonable interpretation would include any
contractual relationship in effect at the time of such proposed
79

Id.

0 Id.

81 REPORT OF THE COUNCIL ON WAGE
82 42 U.S.C. § 6215 (Supp. II 1978).

AND PRICE STABILITY
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Presidential rule or order.

More significantly, the EPA has indicated informally that it
does not believe that this provision would prevent an order from
terminating a contract for the use of low-sulfur coal if such contract includes a force majeure provision which has any reference
to governmental regulations or acts of administrative agencies.
The EPA's theory is that if the parties have included such a provision, they have anticipated the possibility that a section 125(b)
order could interfere with the execution of their obligations and
therefore the contractual relationship is not violated by a section
125(b) order. Thus, it is possible that EPA may take the position
that the Hansen amendment grandfather clause83 in no way limits
its power to void existing low-sulfur coal contracts. In light of this
position, a careful review of the terms of all existing contracts,
and especially those now being negotiated, is recommended for all
producers and their counsel.
V.

CONSTITUTIONAL AND OTHER CHALLENGES TO SECTION

125

Because of its potentially sweeping impact on both the entire
coal industry and the development of national energy policy, section 125 has been the subject of extensive controversy and emerging litigation. As of July 1980, two major challenges to the statute
and the Ohio proceedings are pending in the federal court system.
While it is possible that a number of the provisions outlined
above may later give rise to similar challenges, these are the only
two matters now pending, and they are summarized below.
On January 16, 1979, McCoy-Elkhorn Coal Corporation filed
a complaint in the United States District Court, Eastern District
of Kentucky, at Pikeville, against the EPA.8 4 McCoy-Elkhorn, a
producer of low-sulfur coal located in eastern Kentucky, sued to
challenge the constitutionality of section 125 contending that the
"[e]lectric utilities located in Ohio constitute a natural market for
McCoy-Elkhorn's coal," and that because the section 125 proceedings in Ohio could foreclose or substantially restrict that
market, the section was unconstitutional.

5

83 Id.

- McCoy-Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 13 ENWv. REP. (BNA) 1025 (E.D. Ky. 1979).
85 Id., Complaint.
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McCoy-Elkhorn argued that section 125 constituted an unreasonable and unlawful exercise of federal power under the commerce clause, article I, section 8, clause 3 of the United States
Constitution, because any order under section 125(b) would in effect "interfere with the functioning of interstate markets and protect special interests by precluding McCoy-Elkhorn from selling
its Kentucky-produced low-sulfur coal in significant interstate
markets and by impairing McCoy-Elkhorn's right to engage in the
interstate sale of its Kentucky-produced coal to Ohio customers."88 McCoy-Elkhorn also alleged that section 125 was unlawful because it imposed an unreasonable and impermissible
burden on interstate commerce by precluding private persons,
such as the Ohio electric utilities, from availing themselves of coal
sold in interstate commerce, and by prohibiting private persons,
such as McCoy-Elkhorn's Ohio utility customers, from entering
into contracts for the purchase
of coal solely because it originates
87
in a state other than Ohio.
Briefs amicus curiae were filed by four members of the
United States House of Representatives8 8 to aid the court's understanding of the legislative history and intent of the provision.
The position taken by the four members of Congress asserts the
constitutionality of section 125, but cites its legislative history for
the conclusion that the phrase "locally or regionally available
coal" was never intended to preclude the use of Kentucky coal in
Ohio. 9
The EPA, the state of Ohio and the United Mine Workers
argued that the plaintiff did not present a case or controversy
under article HI, section 2 of the Constitution, but the court rejected that assertion, stating that no "reason is presented upon
which this Court should limit Plaintiff's opportunity to litigate its
claim since its attack goes only to statutory and not to administrative action concerns."90
88 Id.
87

Id.

" Messrs. Carl Perkins of Kentucky, Thomas L. Ashley of Ohio, John P.
Murtha of Pennsylvania and John Slack of West Virginia.
88 Brief armicus curiae, McCoy-Elkhom Coal Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 13 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1025 (E.D. Ky. 1979).
90 McCoy-Elkhorn Coal Corp. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 13 ENvm. REP. (BNA) 1025, 1027 (E.D. Ky. 1979).
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On May 7, 1979, the court issued its "Memorandum Opinion" sustaining the validity and constitutionality of section 125.91
The court read, earlier Supreme Court cases as establishing the
"power of Congress to regulate commerce... as awesome," and
that any limitation of the commerce power must be found in the
fifth amendment. Since section 125 was an economic legislative
act, according to the district court, it carried a presumption of
constitutionality which could only be overcome by a showing of
arbitrariness or irrationality. The court could not find the requisite arbitrariness or irrationality. Indeed, it found that the
enactment of the national Clean Air legislation clearly resulted
in unbalancing the normal market competition between the
Ohio high-sulfur coal industry and nearby low-sulfur coal producers. The Federally enhanced low-sulfur coal market is now
the object of legislative discrimination in favor of the high-sulfur coal produced within a region putatively distressed. Section 125 is intended to provide a remedy, if warranted by the
requisite factual justifications. There is a rational nexus between the depressed Ohio coal industry and the remedy sought
to be provided by Section 125V1
Even though section 125 might harm McCoy-Elkhorn, and
others allied with it, the court ruled that their remedies lie with
"the political process, not

. . .

the judiciary."93 The court rea-

soned that the commerce clause "empowers the Congress to provide protection to some local industries at the expense of other
local industries."" Consequently, the court upheld the facial constitutionality of section 125. Both parties appealed9 to
the Sixth
1
Circuit, where the case is pending after arguments. '

In the other case pending challenging section 125, the Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (CEI) filed a complaint in
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio, naming as defendants the United States Environmental
91

Id. at

1028.

92 Id. at 1029.
93Id.

"Id. (citing Secretary of Agriculture v. Central Roig Refining Corp., 338 U.S.
604 (1950)).

"- Ed. note. The Sixth Circuit, affirming the district court, recently upheld
the validity of the provision against all of the constitutional challenges. McCoyElkhorn Coal Corp. v. United States EPA, No. 79-3326 (6th Cir. June 2, 1980);
CoAL AGE, Sept. 1980, at 167, cols. 1, 2.
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Protection Agency and certain individual officials of EPA. The
complaint was a six-part attack on section 125, challenging both
its facial validity and its application in the Ohio proceedings. The
first claim of the complaint alleges numerous instances of bias
and prejudice on the part of the defendants in conducting the
section 125 proceedings in Ohio.9 5 The incidents are alleged to
have occurred both before and during the proceedings, and are
said to reflect a prejudgment by the defendants of crucial issues
under section 125."
The second claim alleges improper ex parte contacts between
special interest groups representing Ohio coal interests and officials of the EPA.97 The third claim contends that the section 125
hearings in Ohio should have been adjudicatory proceedings
rather than informal rulemaking proceedings.9 8 The fifth claim alleges that the section 125 proceedings have impaired CEI's property rights under contracts and arrangements for purchasing coal
from sources located outside Ohio. 99 The fifth claim further alleges that the EPA has subjected CEI to inconsistent requirements by first requiring the utility to comply with sulfur dioxide
emission limitations no later than October 1979, and then indicating that it is going to force CEI to miss the October 1979 deadline
by requiring CEI to burn Ohio high-sulfur coal at several of its
facilities. 100
The first, second, third and fifth claims of the complaint all
contend that the matters complained of amount to violations of
CEI's rights under the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. The fourth claim takes a different approach, alleging that section 125, on its face and as applied by the EPA, exceeds the authority of Congress under the commerce clause because it seeks to erect impenetrable barriers against interstate
competition with Ohio coal producers.1 01
Finally, the sixth claim alleges that CEI's right to equal pro93 Complaint, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, filed Feb. 28, 1979).
"Id.
97Id.
98 Id.
99Id.

'Do Id.
101 Id.
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tection of the laws under the fifth amendment has been violated
by the section 125 proceedings.20 2 This results from CEI being
made part of a very small disfavored class of certain Ohio electric
utilities that will be permitted to buy coal only from Ohio coal
producers.1 03 This claim of a denial of equal protection is also
based on the fact that CEI, unlike other electric utilities and
other major fuel burning stationary sources, will not be permitted
to comply with sulfur dioxide emission limitations by utilization
of low-sulfur coal from nearby states.110
CEI pressed its attack on section 125 by filing a motion for a
preliminary injunction on March 13, 1979. This motion, read in
conjunction with the complaint, seeks a preliminary and permanent injunction enjoining the EPA and the individual defendants
from taking any further action under section 125 in Ohio because
of the unconstitutionality of that statute.103 CEI requested in the
alternative that any further proceedings under section 125 be enjoined until such time as the President appoints an unbiased
hearing panel to conduct them.
In response to the complaint and the motion for a preliminary injunction, the Government filed a motion to dismiss 0 8
based on several grounds. First, the Government asserted that
CEI's claim of section 125's unconstitutionality does not present a
justiciable case or controversy and is not ripe for adjudication. 107
Next, they alleged that CEI itself lacks standing to assert the
claim of unconstitutionality.10 8 In addition, the Government further contended that jurisdiction over any challenge of section 125
is vested by virtue of section 307(b) of the Clean Air Act 09 in the
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.1120
102 Id.

103 Id.
104

Id.

Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v.
United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, motion
filed Mar. 13, 1979).
Io Motion to Dismiss by the Defendant, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, motion fied 1979).
107 Id.
208 Id.
105

109 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)
110

(Supp. I 1977).

Motion to Dismiss by the Defendant, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
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In response to CEI's contention that it was entitled to adjudicatory hearings in the section 125 proceedings, the Government
maintained that its informal meetings were all required by section 125(a). 111 In addition, the Government argued that CEI's
challenge to the nature of the hearings was premature, because
for so long as the matter was before the EPA, that agency might
arrange for additional procedural safeguards to be used at later
stages in the decision-making process112
The Government met CEI's allegations of unfair bias and
prejudice by contending that EPA officials are permitted to have
"an underlying philosophy in approaching a specific case."113 In
addition, although the Government did not deny that ex parte
contacts with representatives of the Ohio coal industry took
place, the Government maintained that such communications
11 4
nonetheless have not reduced the proceedings to a sham.
The Government's motion dealt extensively with CEI's contention that section 125 violated the commerce clause.115 In essence, the Government asserted that section 125 represents a
valid exercise by Congress of its sweeping constitutional authority
to regulate commerce. This argument is identical to the Government's successful argument on the issue in the McCoy-Elkhorn 16
case.
The motion to dismiss refuted CEI's equal protection claim
by asserting that the classifications made by section 125 are rationally related to a constitutional objective.117 It also responded
to CEI's due process claim for impairment of its property rights
in contracts for the supply of coal and other goods by contending
that CEI's contract rights are subordinate to congressional au-

v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, No. C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, motion filed 1979).
1I Id.
112Id.
113Id.
114

Id.

115 Id.

See supra notes 91-94.
Motion to Dismiss by the Defendant, Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, C79-383 (N.D. Ohio, motion
filed 1979).
"I

117
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thority under the commerce clause.1 1

CEI rebutted the Government's motion to dismiss with a
memorandum in opposition. 119 On the question of the court's jurisdiction over the action, CEI asserted that the allegations of due
process and commerce clause violations are sufficient to give the
court general federal question jurisdiction.120 In addition, because
section 125 is an act of Congress to regulate commerce, CEI maintained that the court also has jurisdiction pursuant to the provision of specific application in such cases.12
On the issue of ripeness, CEI asserted that final administrative action is not a prerequisite to justiciability of ari attack on
administrative proceedings, but rather that a "pragmatic" approach to determining ripeness is appropriate in light of Abbott
Laboratories v. Gardner.22 Applying Abbott's pragmatic approach toward ripeness, CEI contended that it would incur a
hardship if review of the manner in which the administrative proceedings were conducted and the constitutionality of section 125
were postponed, and that in addition the improbability that later
events would have any substantial impact on the nature of CEI's
grievances demonstrated that CEI's claims were ripe for review.
Similarly, on the standing issue, CEI asserted that the threatened
or actual injury stemming from the application of an allegedly unconstitutional statute in an unconstitutional manner, which could
result in massive capital expenditures by CEI, was sufficient to
support its standing to maintain the action.1 22
CEI denied that section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act gave
the court of appeals exclusive jurisdiction over the case, because
that provision applies only when the EPA Administrator has
taken a final administrative action. 124 Therefore, since CEI did
118 Id.
s" Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, C79383 (N.D. Ohio, filed May 10, 1979).
110 Id. (under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976)).
121 Id. (under 28 U.S.C. § 1337 (1976)).
2387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967).
223Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Cleveland
Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, C79383 (N.D. Ohio, filed May 10, 1979).
124

Id.
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not seek review of such a final action, it maintained that the court
of appeals had no jurisdiction to redress the wrongs alleged in
CEI's complaint. CEI further contended that the court need not
await final
administrative action prior to granting injunctive
125
relief.

CEI also addressed the issues of bias and prejudice allegedly
held by the EPA officials conducting the proceedings, asserting
that the case law at a minimum requires the appearance of fairness. 126 As to the ex parte contacts, CEI contended that a district
court need not await the completion of an administrative process
before acting to remedy the impermissible impact of such com27
munications.1

The State of Ohio, the Governor of Ohio and the United
Mine Workers of America, District Six, all have sought to intervene as defendant parties in this action. CEI has filed a memorandum opposing such intervention, but this matter has not yet
been resolved by the district court.
CONCLUSION

This review of the short, but turbulent history of section 125
underscores the serious difficulties inherent in the attempted implementation of the statute as enacted. It seems clear that more
careful legislative consideration of the original proposal through
the hearing process would have resulted in a more enforceable
and understandable policy.
The first set of problems posed by the current language
stems from the difficulty of creating precise and useful definitions
for the concepts espoused by the sponsors. As discussed previously, the underlying concept of "local or regional coal" is difficult at best and subject to interpretations which can actually be
counterproductive. Furthermore, the introduction of the term
125

Id. For support of this point CEI cited Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d

755 (D.C. Cir. 1972), and Amos Treat & Co. v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n,

306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
126 See American Cyanamid Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 363 F.2d 757, 767
(6th Cir. 1966), and Texaco, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 336 F.2d 754, 760
(D.C. Cir. 1964).
127 See Association of National Advertisers v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 460 F.
Supp. 966 (D.D.C. 1978).
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"significant unemployment" or "significant economic disruption"
in a pollution control statute could only be expected to compound
these difficulties.
A second set of serious problems is posed by the enforcement
and prosecutorial mechanism established by the legislation. In
particular, the role of the EPA as judge and prosecutor, even if
marginally constitutional, creates a milieu for administrative
schizophrenia. In addition, the difficulties in distinguishing between rulemaking and adjudication with respect to individual
generating facilities will have substantial impact on the substantive rights of utilities and coal suppliers which may be subjected
to sanctions.
As serious as the problems of practical nature exhibited by
the current statute may be, it is the underlying policies embodied
in section 125 which should receive most critical scrutiny in the
immediate future. First, the idea of assigning to EPA the roles of
economic referee, job allocator and energy coordinator must be
questioned seriously. This seems to be a classic case of institutional miscasting. The EPA's ad hoc response in the current section 125 proceedings demonstrates the mistake of thrusting a pollution control agency into the role of economic regulator. Neither
the EPA's institutional point of view nor technical resources are
appropriate for this. Serious consideration should be given to
reassigning this function to the Department of Energy, which has
accumulated much more experience with such allocation functions and the balancing process which must accompany them.
Another policy problem of the current legislation is the attempt to resolve regional conflicts over energy sources without
taking into account the overall national interest. Section 125 is
but one of a proliferating number of attempts to resolve such discord. In the past few years individual states have attempted to
impose taxes on either the importation or exportation of coal and
natural gas, as well as on the sale of electricity generated from
local coal.128 National patterns of energy production and con-

'" Maryland v. Louisiana, Orig. Action No. 83 (S. Ct., filed March 29, 1979),
48 U.S.L.W. 3063 (1979); Mapco, Inc. v. Grunder, 12 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2025
(N.D. Ohio 1979); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, No. 42657 (1st Jud.
Dist. Ct., Lewis & Clark County, Mont., filed July 27, 1979), appeal docketed, No.
14982 (Mont. Aug. 24, 1979); Arco Pipe Line Co. v. State, No. 79-1903 (Super. Ct.,
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sumption must be evaluated to serve the overall national interest
and cannot rationally be regulated for the long term by using concepts such as regional impacts.
Finally, careful economic analysis should be undertaken to
determine the real costs and benefits of the section 125 scheme of
imposing the high costs of peculiar pollution control methodology
on particular groups of consumers and ratepayers. In the case of
the Ohio proceedings under section 125, the additional, unnecessary costs of constructing and installing flue-gas desulfurization
equipment to allow and encourage the use of high-sulfur Ohio
coal would be borne primarily by those who would gain no benefit
from the supposed increase in coal employment. This hidden
transfer of costs and benefits is of questionable wisdom when considered from the point of view of the overall public interest.

3d Jud. Dist., Alas., filed March 19, 1979).
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